We went back and forth for MONTHS about this—whether there would have been a ball-turret gunner on this mission. I argued vociferously that by this time in the war they'd removed the ball-turret position, but *nowhere* could I find proof . . . on Reddit they hemmed and hawed and I just got zilch.
Until . . . well, the HOLY GRAIL. A memoir by a fellow named John Mahoney, who was a legend in the 467th—I actually talked to him in person at a 467th reunion in 2002—that, well, it's just packed with information I could never, ever have found otherwise.
So . . . with no further drama, I announce the validation of my argument:
______________________________________________________________________
We became intrigued by other possibilities afforded by this system. A number of base activities could visualize application of this system to their operations. For example, we were continually trying to analyze the patterns of attack by German fighters in order to arrange our formations for best defense against them. We set up a program to track the number of rounds fired, by gun location, against attacking Jerries.
An analysis of these data together with consideration of our gunners’ claims of ‘destroyed’ and ‘probable’ against the attackers, made evident what we'd long suspected: that the ball turret on a B-24 was of little or no defensive value against enemy air attacks.
It was a rare occasion when this position had an opportunity to fire its weapons, and even more rare when a ball gunner claimed even a ‘probable.’ Looking at the ball turret then in realistic terms, we were risking a life, using up a lot of system oxygen, carrying his weight and that of a 2,100 pound turret, for nothing.
He wasn't getting any effective shots because the most damaging attacks being made on us were from frontal and high positions. Adding the attacker's speed to our own, the rate of closure was at least 800 miles per hour. With a maximum effective range of about 500 yards, our top and nose turret gunners who could see the attacker coming in al the way had only a couple of seconds for possible effective fire. The ball turret, who couldn’t see the attacker until after he had fired on us, had virtually no opportunity to position his guns for effective fire as the ‘bandit’ zipped by.
After building up our case against the ball, we went to the Old Man with the recommendation that we should eliminate ball turrets from at least some of our planes and see what effect, if any, it might have on our vulnerability.
We already knew it would increase the performance of the plane. Although he was a confirmed “do-it-by-the-book” West Pointer, and sometimes strenuously resisted our frequent attempts to do things otherwise, he readily recognized the significance of our case and gave a reluctant okay. We then removed the turrets from one squadron's planes and reassigned the gunners to a crew pool.
We had checked pretty carefully what the effect of weight loss would be on the center of gravity along the MAC (Mean Aerodynamic Chord), and on the elevator controls. It moved forward the center of gravity, increased speed, reduced fuel consumption minutely, and made the plane less tail-heavy for landing.’ We had just one worry.
We had modified a piece of government equipment without approval. This was in violation of Air Corps regulations which clearly stated that all modifications had to be tested, then sanctioned and published in Tech Orders by Wright Patterson Field in Dayton, Ohio. The Old Man was taking a risk, and to a career officer this could be costly. Our test worked so well that within a couple of months you couldn't find a ball turret in any of our planes.
—From John Mahoney: Reluctant Witness: Memoirs from the Last Year of the European Air War 1944-45
Pages 274-79
No comments:
Post a Comment